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Forty years after the Johnson
Administration launched its War on
Poverty, we still cannot hoist a ban-
ner proclaiming “Mission Accom-
plished!”  And in coming decades the
United States will face the loss of its
“Baby Boomer” prime-age workers,
as well as the need to pay for their
retirement costs.  Salvation is at
hand—but only if we will finally adopt
a promising policy proposal as old as
the War on Poverty itself.
That proposal would greatly
expand “early-childhood education”
(ECE)—systematic training in learn-
ing and social skills, for pre-kinder-
gartners.  Evidence is overwhelming
that targeting ECE at low-income kids
would be that rare bird, a win-win
public policy initiative.  Investing big
in ECE would greatly enhance eco-
nomic efficiency, yielding higher
returns than spending on buildings,
equipment—or “catch-up” efforts like
enriching inner-city elementary and
high schools.  Into the bargain, society
would also reap higher future incomes
for today’s disadvantaged children,
making for a more equitable distribu-
tion of income.
Usually, policies aimed at reducing
inequities also increase economic inef-
ficiency.  The late Arthur Okun of
Brookings likened such policies to car-
rying water in leaky buckets: The total
water available is smaller than before
the program began.
ECE investments are an exception
to Okun’s rule, and both the Federal
and state governments have devoted
some funds to it, beginning with the
90%-Federally-subsidized “Head
Start” program dating back to the late
1960s.  Yet four decades later, large
numbers of poor children go unserved.
By investing more in ECE,
Connecticut could constructively
address daunting challenges of both
future manpower and social justice.
WHAT IS “EARLY CHILDHOOD
EDUCATION” (ECE)?
In its broadest sense, ECE ranges
from summer church school, to day
care or “Head Start” programs, to the
heralded, heavy-duty pilot projects
begun in the 1960s, such as the Perry
Preschool Project in Ypsilanti, MI
(1962-67), and the Carolina
Abecedarian Program (1972-76).  
For present purposes, though, the
narrower label “high-quality early
development program”, encountered
in the literature, works well (J. Burr
and R. Grunewald, “Lessons
Learned…”, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, April 2006).  “Quality”
is measured by bachelor’s-level teacher
training and a low child/teacher ratio.
So we’re not talking about summer
church school, plain vanilla day care,
or even Head Start (unless it is
“enriched” with state or local resources
and applies higher teacher standards
than Washington imposes).  But nei-
ther is the costly intensity of the Perry
or Abecedarian projects, designed as
research efforts, required.
WHY IS ECE A WIN-WIN PUBLIC
POLICY?
James Heckman, a Nobel-laureate
economist at the University of
Chicago, has spearheaded the econom-
ic research on early childhood educa-
tion over the past decade or more.
With varying teams of Ph.D. students
and colleagues, Heckman has shown
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empirically that ECE delivers impres-
sive economic returns, and has
explained why.  In a January 2006
speech, Heckman summarized their
results: 
Early interventions for disadvantaged
children promote schooling, raise the
quality of the workforce, enhance the
productivity of schools and reduce crime,
teenage pregnancy and welfare depend-
ency.  They raise earnings and promote
social attachment.  Focusing solely on




Besides higher earnings, a 2004
study for Boston-based Strategies for
Children reported a return of nearly
18% on a $600 million ECE invest-
ment, in the form of school cost sav-
ings, higher tax revenues, and lower
outlays on crime and child health and
welfare benefits.
ECE is such a “magic bullet”
because skill acquisition is dynamic in
nature.  Early inputs to both cognitive
(e.g., reading) and non-cognitive (e.g.,
social) skills heavily affect the produc-
tivity of inputs added later:
Skill begets skill; motivation begets moti-
vation.  Early failure begets later failure.
(Idem., page 3)
We know (1) that early family
environments are significant predictors
of non-cognitive and cognitive skill
acquisition; (2) that family environ-
ments have declined, not improved, on
average since the 1960s; (3) that early
interventions for high-risk children
can effectively short-circuit the nega-
tive effects of unfavorable family cir-
cumstances—and raise recipients’
incomes later in life; and (4) that wait-
ing until later to intervene—with
smaller high-school class sizes, public
job training programs, convict rehab
programs, tuition subsidies, and the
like—is far costlier per unit return
than early interventions.
The figure below (based on simu-
lated investment returns derived from
empirical work) illustrates Heckman’s
argument.  The returns to education
for all children, disadvantaged or not,
are highest for the earliest investments.
But because the parents of advantaged
kids already buy ECE, enlightened
public policy could focus taxpayer-
funded ECE investments first on chil-
dren with the greatest needs—and the
highest yields.
The table, from a 2007 Heckman
paper with Flavio Cunha, compares
four possible public investment strate-
gies, again based on empirical results.
Column (1) shows the “no interven-
tion” baseline of various achievement
rates for kids with 1st-decile skills at
age 6 and (in adolescence) 1st-decile
parental involvement.  Column (2)
shows the same rates for children who
experience early “high-quality” ECE
intervention.  Column (3) shows that
it is possible to play catch-up with ado-
lescent interventions, but it costs bet-
ter than one-third more.  And because
the effects of the high-quality inter-
vention in column (2) raise the pro-
ductivity of later interventions, an
“optimal” program of early and adoles-
cent investments makes possible the
stellar achievements shown in column
(4).
Compared with column (1), either
the “early” intervention of column (2)
or the more expensive “later” interven-
tion of column (3), boost high school
graduation and college enrollment
rates, by 60% and 170%, respectively.
And rates of conviction, being on pro-
bation, and being on welfare decline
by 25%, 30%, and nearly half, respec-
tively.
The “optimal” intervention shown
in column (4) clearly dominates both
column (2) and column (3).  High-
school graduation and college-enroll-
ment rates are two-fifths and three
times higher, while the probabilities of
being convicted, on probation, or on
welfare are two-fifths, half, and a quar-
ter of the baseline.
But the truly impressive results
show up by comparing the optimal
intervention, early and later on, in col-
umn (4) with the do-nothing case in
column (1).  Optimal ECE investment
raises the rate of high-school gradua-
tion by 2.2 times, and the chances of
enrolling in college by some 8.4 times!
And it cuts the chance of being con-
victed of a crime by better than half,
THE EARLIER, THE BETTER
HOW ECE INVESTMENT 
STRATEGIES COMPARE
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that of being on probation by nearly
two-thirds, and that of being on wel-
fare by 85 percent.
And that’s not to mention the far
higher adult earnings of the kid blessed
with an optimal intervention, com-
pared with those of a “baseline” child.
AN ECE WIN-WIN FOR
CONNECTICUT?
The centerpiece of Republican
Governor Rell’s budget initiative this
year was a large increase in education
spending.  Yet of the total tab of $3.4
billion (over 5 years) for her program,
the Governor proposed only $64 mil-
lion—1.8%—for pre-school educa-
tion.  Over in the General Assembly,
the Democratic majority virtually
ignored public education (as opposed
to property tax relief per se), and exhib-
ited zero interest in ECE.  So are
Connecticut’s political leaders walking
away from a sure bet for easing pover-
ty and rebuilding the state’s labor
force?
There is plenty of opportunity for
Connecticut to take advantage of
investing more in ECE.  According to
data from the National Center for
Children in Poverty (NCCP), in 2005
some 28% of children under age 6 in
the Nutmeg State lived in “low-
income” households—defined as dou-
ble the Federal poverty level of
$20,000 per year (http://www.nccp.
org/pub_ycp06b.html).  Only three
states—New Hampshire, Minnesota
and Massachusetts—did better.  We
were at 39% in 1995, and reached a
low of 25% in 1999.  Nationally, the
figure fell from 47% in 1995 to only
41% in 1999, where it has been stuck
ever since.
But Connecticut has not done
nearly as well in expanding access to
ECE as it has in lowering the propor-
tion of low-income children.  This,
despite the establishment in 1997 of a
“School Readiness” program targeted
at “priority” school districts and
“severe-needs” schools.  According to
data from the 2006 State Preschool
Yearbook, published by the National
Institute for Early Education Research
or NIEER (http://nieer.org/year-
book/), in 2006 Connecticut ranked
only 19th in access for 4-year olds, and
11th for 3-year olds.  
The somewhat better 3-year old
rank has more to do with weak compe-
tition than with stellar performance.
Oklahoma, the national poster child
for overall preschool policy, is first in
access for 4-year olds, but “none-
served” for 3-year olds.  Even so, only
70% of Sooner 4-year olds were
enrolled in ECE in 2006, which says a
lot about how shabby the national
ECE effort is.  (In 2006, 12 states,
including Rhode Island, still had no
ECE program.)  And that nearly half
of Oklahoma kids under age 6 lived in
“low-income” circumstances in 2005
(per the NCCP) suggests that
Connecticut’s  relative ECE effort is
laggard.
Ah, but we are generous: State
spending per child enrolled in a pre-K
program in 2006 was $7,101, placing
us 4th behind New Jersey, Oregon,
and Minnesota.  Poster-child Okla-
homa, by contrast, spent only $3,364
per enrolled child.
The State Department of
Education’s useful data base,
Connecticut Education Data and
Research or CEDaR) (www. csde.
state.ct.us/public/cedar/districts/index.
htm), includes data on the share of
entering kindergartners with
“prekindergarten experience.”  State-
wide, the share stood at about 75% in
the school year 2000-01; by 2005-06,
the figure had crept close to 80% (see
the centerfold).  But there is less than
meets the eye in that impressive-
sounding statistic, because “pre-K
experience”—Head Start, a nursery
school, a licensed day care center, or
public pre-school program—is quite a
bit broader than the “high-quality
ECE” referred to by professionals and
researchers. 
Governor Rell’s signature educa-
tion plan announced in early 2007
referred merely to financing “one-third
of … unmet pre-school needs”, but the
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projected costs—according to the
State’s Office of Policy and
Management, $18.8 million in fiscal
year 2008 (which begins July 1, 2007)
and $44.9 million for FY 2009, with
$41.6 million over the two years
specifically to add 4,000 State-funded
ECE slots—imply that the governor
has “high-quality” programs in mind.
(The arithmetic suggests that the State
outlay per slot is expected to rise from
the 2006 level of $7,101.)  By the gov-
ernor’s own rhetoric, it would take
only $83 million more to provide State
spaces for all at-risk children who sore-
ly need ECE.
For all the Governor’s laudable
effort, she apparently has not bought
into the compelling logic, and evi-
dence, of ECE research.  Whereas her
ambitious education plan would entail
several  billions of dollars over five
years, she is seeking only tens of mil-
lions of dollars for early childhood edu-
cation.  True, the governor’s Early
Childhood Cabinet has recommended
a cradle-to-3rd-grade early-education
program as part of a broader early-
childhood plan.  So, Governor Rell is
talking the talk, but her education plan
does not yet walk the walk. 
In fact, even when it comes to
talk, the governor seems not to have
fully comprehended the implications
of the Heckman-led research.
Contrast the chart and table discussed
above with her remarks in a March
2007 speech before the Connecticut
Business and Industry Association on
behalf of her big education initiative:  
Now, think of those [school] dropouts.
Think of those teen pregnancies.  Think
of those who never learned to read,
write, or learn [sic] math.  Think of the
thousands upon thousands who have
been left behind and who are still being
left behind.  Will they ever catch up?  Is
there any hope for them?  What about
those who follow them?  Shall we give up
on them?  Shall we expect less of them?
No one would dispute the gover-
nor’s argument.  Yet the primary focus
of her multi-billion-dollar initiative is
on remedial learning; only $63 million
is targeted at early childhood interven-
tion.
In a sense, the billions for remedi-
ation in the governor’s education plan
are a testimonial to one of Heckman’s
findings: the high cost of not investing
big bucks in those dropouts’ lives years
ago, but instead waiting until adoles-
cence to try and make up for missed
opportunities.  Far be it from me to
deny remedial programs to those in
need of them today.  But why not
triple the funding for ECE in the
Governor’s initiative, increasing the
size of her initiative to do so?
WHY DO WE PERSISTENTLY
UNDERINVEST IN SUCH A 
GOOD THING?
If ECE is that good, one may won-
der what everybody is waiting for.  Are
our leaders so dense that they willfully
ignore such a good thing?
Perhaps, but more fairly (because
politicians ought to be judged within
the existing political system): There’s
just not that much effective political
support for ECE.
Theories of voter behavior and
ample empirical evidence suggest that
people vote their interests.  Surely, one
might argue, lower-income parents
have an interest in increasing public
spending on ECE.  But do they vote?
Not in the same proportions that mid-
dle-class parents do when their inter-
est, K-12 public-school budgets, is on
the ballot.  And those same middle-
class parents can afford to pay for pri-
vate ECE, topped up with supporting
inputs at home (books, challenging
games, family trips, and the like).
Why should they vote to increase their
taxes to subsidize less-fortunate kids’
access to comparable goodies before
they enter kindergarten?
Clearly, and who would gainsay it,
the political clout behind State grants
to towns trumps that behind State
funding for early-childhood educa-
tion.
I know!  What about a major ini-
tiative for voter education, registra-
tion, and participation among
Connecticut’s low-income citizens?
We persistently 
underinvest in ECE, 
because there’s 
little political support 
for public 
early-childhood 
investments.